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This paper focuses on three transmission processes of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis impacts;
pandemic turbulences in ﬁnancial markets, side e#ects on capital ﬂows, and contractive impacts on
the real economy in many counties. The processes will be further discussed in the context of
emerging/transitional economies, followed by some policy implications for Uzbekistan.
I. Impacts of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis
A series of ﬁnancial turbulences, triggered o# by the so-called “sub-prime” in the
USA, culminated in catching the international ﬁnancial sector o# its euphoric guard in
September 2008. In hindsight, it was obvious that the global ﬁnancial system had been
indulged in a euphoric illusion of safety mainly due to the vague perception that
ﬁnancial experts, traders and regulators were doing their best in getting round the
critical situation. Already many papers and books have discussed this issue and related
matters, including IMF’s WEO (World Economic Outlook) and GFSR (Global Financial
Stability Report) issued in April, 2009, etc. The Uzbek presentation, “The Global
Economic Crisis, Ways and Measures to Overcome It in the Conditions of Uzbekistan”
was explained during May 22’s conference in the Central Asian context. Apart from
these public papers, most recently, Gillian Tett2, British lady journalist, has published
“Fool’s Gold” focusing on the plight of the world ﬁnancial sector compounded by
ﬁnancial derivatives and innovations.
The impacts of the most recent global ﬁnancial crisis on the real economy in many
countries could be broken down into three-fold processes: (1) pandemic fears in many
ﬁnancial markets, in particular almost free-fall decline in stock markets, steep rise in
various spreads between safe and risky assets, and dramatic shrinkage in ﬁnancial
markets, which have invited (2) quick withdrawals of capital from emerging/transi-
tional economies and economic frontiers in mature economies to safe harbors. The
resultant serious liquidity squeeze has, in turn, brought about (3) immediate contractive
impacts on the real economy in many countries, in particular the export sector and
internationally interwoven businesses. The instability in commodity markets has added
to the ﬁnancial and economic turbulences.
The (1) and (2) are straightforward in transmission and visible in major economic
indicators, while the (3) is somewhat diversiﬁed in di#erent regions and countries.
The (1) is represented by ﬁnancial fears, fueled by the collapse of the myth “too big
to fail”, which became suddenly pandemic in almost all the ﬁnancial markets, involving
many emerging/transitional countries, and inviting the distrust even among banks and
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ﬁnancial institutions (market failure). Some money reactions went too far but remained
extremely di$cult to correct. The impacts of the (1) were almost simultaneous due to
the nature of network externality based on close international market linkages.3 In
these circumstances, underlying uncertainties revealed themselves quickly, including
the unreliability of securitized ﬁnancial products and “originate-to-distribute” (OTD)
model, incapability of rating agencies and now discredited CDS. Even suspicious views
were presented to the nature of ﬁnancial engineering that has dominated the modern
ﬁnancial theory. In addition, painful complaints were presented to the international
accounting/auditing standards.
In the process, a blame game (hunting for culprits or drivers) has been played in
many forums. For instance, (i) some disputants emphasized myopic business behavior of
speciﬁc managers/traders of ﬁnancial institutions, in particular unregulated investment
bankers and defectively securitized products/derivatives (or toxic assets), while others
emphasized (ii) defective regulatory framework, unreliable rating capability and poor
corporate governance or (iii) widespread speculative mentality (money worship, greed
and over-leveraging), under-disciplined macro-economic management tolerating easy
money policy (Greenspan put option), virulent contagion from the US ﬁnance, global
imbalance with external deﬁcit/surplus, or unfettered ﬁnancial capitalism at the back-
ground.4
Such argument could often be geared up, on the one side, for a fatalistic view of the
loose nature of human community where people behave just like they think others
doing well, who are blindly follow leading speakers or credit rating agencies (herding or
plausible deniability). It could also be geared up for a mechanical view of ﬁnancial
network externality/vulnerability fueled by information/communication technologies
(ICT). On the other, it could be geared up for an endless argument whether economic
progress is stimulated by easy money policy or not (economic growth is most likely to
be accompanied by cheap/abundant credit), or when the punch bowl should be taken
away if a ﬁnancial party goes wild; more sober Volcker-type approach or less sober
Greenspan-type approach.
In any case, the extraordinary ﬁnancial situation has demanded a new package of
monetary policy measures, such as reductions in policy target interest rate near zero,
special guarantee to creditor/debtor banks, quantitative easing as well as credit easing
policy, most of which have been undertaken by monetary authorities immediately;
stiﬂed money ﬂows in a number of mature markets required liquidity provision through
the new market operation practices of purchasing a variety of ﬁnancial assets, including
even non-bank ﬁnancial institutions.5 The weakened bank soundness has also been
reinforced by capital injections and authoritative purchases of bad loans through tax
money. Deposit protection has also been pursued by a number of mature and emerging/
transitional countries.
In the context of transitional economies in general, the global ﬁnancial crisis has
cast a shadow over the two-decade economic gains. The ﬁrst and severe impact on many
transitional economies was serious credit shortages and di$culties in reﬁnancing their
external obligations. They have continued to face and tackle with the unprecedented
economic turmoil since their independence from command economic framework. Little
voice, however, has been raised against the basic process toward market economy and
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in favor of a return to command economy. Both political leaders and peoples seem to
have seen the current di$culties in proper perspective. Even in the context of transi-
tional Central Asian economies, policy emphasis appears to have been placed, not on
democratic economic/social institutional framework, but on macro economic policies, in
particular monetary easing, liquidity support and capital injections, followed by deposit
guarantees.6
Coupled with the “deleverage” awareness, the (2) as a side e#ect of the (1) has
exposed the ﬁnancial sector ﬁrstly and many other sectors secondly, to liquidity squeeze
in mature economies. As a result, the (3) has impacted the real economy. The household
sector also became very conservative with prospects of rising jobless rate and shrinking
income. The real economy has also witnessed sharp reductions in both business inven-
tories and investment. These contractive impacts have been most visibly reﬂected in the
export sector in many countries, aggravating their future prospects. While in mature
economies such as the USA, EU and Japan, the (1) and (2) have directly paralyzed both
ﬁnancial and other business sectors, the economic downturn in some transitional
economies has emerged multi-fold; for instance, the earlier liquidity contracting impacts
appeared on the Russian economy and subsequent contracting impacts appeared on its
surrounding economies and their economic situation were further exacerbated by the
lowering commodity and energy prices.
II. Impacts on emerging/transitional economies
As discussed above, the side e#ect of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis has been
increasingly and adversely a#ecting many sectors in emerging/transitional economies.
Big corporations in manufacturing/service sectors, mostly dependent on bank credit,
found increasing di$culties in reﬁnancing or obtaining foreign ﬁnancial resources,
which had been a major driving force for their buoyancy.7 This situation was clearly
visible in the expanded CDS spread in many emerging/transitional economies.
The abrupt pullback of foreign capital was also accompanied by considerable
depreciation of local currencies. In the context of emerging/transitional economies, the
abrupt change in ﬁnancial surroundings has driven into economic turmoil Hungary and
Latvia on the one hand and Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Armenia on the other8, whose
external imbalances had been building up ominously.9 Figure 1. clearly shows that,
though often eclipsed by the extraordinary economic performance of Iceland, Ukraine,
located between EU and Russia, has su#ered most seriously owing to its exposure to
external debt, including the household sector’s US dollar borrowings, and preceding
politico/economic confusions. In contrast, Turkey, located between EU and the Middle
East, has remained resilient owing to the economic reform e#orts after the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2001 and relatively solid banking sector.
The intertwining transmission processes of the (3) in emerging/transitional econo-
mies produced multifaceted reactions. In an extreme case, for instance, part of the
household sector in Hungary and some others that enjoyed real-estate boom had
depended for housing loans on borrowings in Swiss francs and Japanese yen with their
exceptionally low interest rates, but they are now su#ering from the swollen debt
resulting from unexpected exchange rate swings.10
Aside from these extreme cases, in emerging/transitional economies, many
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economic projects and business activities were forced to scale down, restructure or
even stop them. The widespread economic depression has demanded ﬂexible and
expansionary ﬁscal stimuli in major countries, which has also inﬂuenced the
macro-economic policies in Central Asian countries.
Figure 1 Emerging Market Performance of Credit Default Swap Spread and Equity Prices (August
2008March 2009)
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More speciﬁcally, the consequences of the (3) di#ered, depending on to what extent
an economy under consideration had been exposed to foreign loan/investment, to what
extent it had su#ered from external imbalances, whether its currency had been sub-
sumed under its nearby hard currency area, and whether foreign ﬁnancial resources had
come directly to the local business sector or indirectly through the local ﬁnancial sector.
These factors would help to analyze the di#erence in impacts of the 2008 global
ﬁnancial crisis among Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, etc.
While the so-called EU Halo e#ect had favored many Central and Eastern European
countries, the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis has revealed the signiﬁcant implications of the
economic basics, such as sound economic management, current account deﬁcits, expo-
sure to external debt, inﬂation, ﬁscal deﬁcits, soundness of the ﬁnancial sector, etc.11 In
other words, the EU membership status tended to help euphoric interpretations of
economic developments of a member country (the Halo e#ect). The euro integration
expelled foreign exchange risk, allowing lower interest rates than otherwise, inviting
capital inﬂows and accelerating credit expansion but concealing basic economic prob-
lems such as loss of competitiveness in export, potential growing businesses and youth
unemployment. Now, however, more emphasis has been placed on prudential macro-
economic aspects, the di#erences of which have created substantially di#erent eco-
nomic consequences among member countries. In short, policy interpretations are
inverted upside down.
In my view, the ﬂexibility of exchange rate policy remains crucial in economic
management for many emerging/transition economies. It is true that the 2008 global
ﬁnancial crisis has severely a#ected exchange rate developments in many parts of the
world. It is also true that the ﬂexible exchange rate adjustments have helped absorb
those external shocks, if not fully. The argument in favor of currency integration merits
recently overwhelmed in and around EU despite basic di#erences in economic infra-
structure in this region. Due to under-consolidated economic infrastructure, the latitude
for macro-economic policy management is positively required for some EU member
countries and in particular many other transition economies outside EU, except for
peripheral economies accounted for by optimal currency area.
In the circumstances, for instance, Latvia, heavily dependant on external debt and
strongly constrained by its ﬁxed exchange rate policy to the euro, has been most
severely positioned like the other two Baltic countries.12 In contrast, Hungary, also
heavily exposed to foreign debt, has witnessed its currency sharply depreciating nearly
30% and in a better position to escape from the shackles of ﬁxed-rate exchange policy.
The di#erence in their policy stance will create di#erent implications for their economic
prospects.
In any case, the overall impacts of the on-going global ﬁnancial/economic crisis are
summarized in the following table showing the developments of real GDP:
Just like Japan, Germany and other mature economies, one of the notable conse-
quences of the (3) is most visible in the export sector which has been adversely a#ected
in many emerging/transitional economies. Their consequences have been complicated
due to modern business activities. This is typical with many East Asian countries where
outsourcing and o#-shoring or multi-tiered and interwoven production processes have
been generally accepted. Through the division-of-labor type of specialization of modern
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production process, an exporter produces components which are used by another
value-added producer and re-exported to a ﬁnal producer who assembles and re-exports
ﬁnal products to the ultimate consumption country.
Another impact of the (3) is visible in remittances for which a number of economies
have been dependent on migrant workers. They have lost an important income source.
This is also the case with Caucasus and Central Asia region as well as those countries
neighboring EU and Mideast oil producing countries.13
Eight months after the Lehman Brothers vaporization in September 2008, the
economic omens are mixed. Some indicators are encouraging, including stock market
indices. Other indicators need cautious interpretations, including jobless rates and
overhanging bad loans in the banking sector. Despite the general recognition that the
global economic situation would be much harder before it becomes easier, more atten-
tion has been paid to those indicators showing “deceleration” of worsening.14 Some
emerging countries are reported to be beginning to bottom out, including China and
Brazil. Other emerging/transitional economies, however, are reported to be su#ering
from economic agony, including the Baltics and a number of countries in East Europe.
Among advanced countries, it is believed that much cannot be expected from the
previous US economic strength sustained by overconsumption and bullish external
penetration. In Europe, Germany’s performance, crucial to its longer-term economic
trend, remains uncertain. The Asian economy is fortunately driven by a number of
promising young economies such as China, India and ASEAN countries in addition to
mature economies like Japan and South Korea, but the export-driven model remains to
be smoothly converted to domestic demand-driven one.
Table 1. Developments in real GDP in selected central Asian countries
(Annual percent change)
2007 2008 2009 2010
Uzbekistan 9.5 9.0 7.0 7.0
Kazakhstan 8.9 3.2 2.0 1.5
Kyrgyz Republic 8.5 7.6 0.9 2.9
Tajikistan 7.8 7.9 2.0 3.0
Turkmenistan 11.6 9.8 6.9 7.0
Azerbaijan 23.4 11.6 2.5 12.3
Russia 8.1 5.6 6.0 0.5
Ukraine 7.9 2.1 8.0 1.0
World output 5.2 3.2 1.3 1.9
United States 2.0 1.1 2.8 0.0
European Union 3.1 1.1 4.0  0.3
Japan 2.4  0.6 6.2 0.5
China 13.0 9.0 6.5 7.5
(Source: WEO (IMF) April 2009, page 86 and REO (IMF) May 2009, page 3.
Rearranged by the author)
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In these circumstances, an economic model with entrepreneurial spirit and with
energy-saving and ecological mind could be nurtured and formed. There, more attention
will be paid to the damaging nature of high leverage, asset bubbles and un- or
under-regulated non-bank activities (shadow banking). More attention will also be paid
to the creeping negative nature of over-extended welfare system, undisciplined ﬁscal
policy and excessive easy monetary policy, which have involved huge public interven-
tion and debt, and after all will lead to inﬂationary pressures. More speciﬁcally for the
ﬁnancial sector, a macro-prudential and regulatory approach, both internationally and
domestically, will be emphasized and pursued.
For some emerging economies, hopefully China, India, and Brazil, some economists
have begun to argue that the worst is over. There remain, however, many opaque
elements before many emerging/transition economies. The Baltics and Hungary will,
with their human resources and wisdom, grope their way out of the current bitter
situations and will consolidate their future economic infrastructure for the next stage.
On this context, for each transition economy, the Regional Economic Outlook (REO,
May 2009 IMF) will have to be read and discussed carefully.
The latest REO characterizes the Caucasus and Central Asia region as follows;
“While linkages to international ﬁnancial market are weak in most countries, the global
economic crisis is being transmitted to the region via falling commodity prices, declin-
ing export demand, and lower remittance inﬂows, particularly from Russia.”15 The
report also analyzes how the Russian economy has a#ected the neighboring countries
through trade, ﬁnancial and remittance channels, indicating that, since the end of
Russian crisis in 1998, the ﬁnancial and remittance channels have been playing a more
important role, though less associated with trade links, between Russia and Caucasus
and Central Asia.16 The forthcoming “Transition report 2009” (European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, EBRD) will pay somewhat di#erent attention to
transitional economies.
Figure 2. Remittance Inﬂows
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III. Some policy implication for Uzbekistan
At the time of writing this paper (May 2009), Uzbekistan appears to have been less
adversely a#ected by the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. There are a number of factors
contributing to this, including a cautious approach to external imbalances and weak
ﬁnancial linkages17, which could be critically regarded as limited external openness
resulting from complicated administrative procedures, more burdensome than red tape.
Some factors are also found in a coordinated ﬁscal and monetary policy. The IMF
mission’s statement issued in December 2008 is surprisingly in favor of the Uzbek
economy resilient to the ongoing global ﬁnancial and economic critical conditions. It
provides a strong contrast to those IMF mission’s statements several years ago. This
favorable assessment is also reﬂected in the IMF mission’s expectation that the Uzbek
economic outlook would remain relatively favorable in 2009. The World Economic
Outlook’s table also indicates a 7.0 increase in real GDP for each 2009 and 2010.18
While welcoming the policy implications of the Welfare Improvement Strategy (WIS)
for a greater role of market principles and the private sector, the EBRD’s diagnosis
seems a little more cautious about the economic and social achievement in Uzbekistan.
In my view, more careful considerations will have to be made to remittance inﬂows and
their implications for macro-economic developments.
With the relatively favorable economic surroundings, the current strength of the
Uzbek economy will allow the medium-term economic reform objectives to be more
positively pursued. As discussed with IMF and other international organizations, more
policy emphasis will have to be placed on enhancement of ﬁnancial intermediation,
liberalization of international trade, a phasing-out of price controls and improvement of
business environments.
More speciﬁcally for the ﬁnancial sector in mature markets, the conventional
ﬁnance has shown many errors and vulnerabilities. However, does it require a drastic
change of its ﬁnancial intermediation model? The historical developments during the
1940s and 50s, and 1990s do not support this claim. Rather, more emphasis has been
placed on more supportive institutions for e#ective function of the market mechanism
in more regulatory environments. Our market economy is built on many institutions,
including the protection of private ownership and proﬁt motive as well as anti-
monopoly framework, beneﬁts for the aged, poor, unemployed and handicapped, public
education and public hygiene, etc.
Likewise, in the ﬁnancial sector, legally ensured trust among economic entities, last
resort of liquidity facilities, deposit protection and prudential requirements have been
already institutionalized. Many of these institutions inside and outside the ﬁnancial
sector go much beyond proﬁt-making market economy. Ironically, the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis took place in these circumstances. Our regulatory approach will be reviewed
seriously toward a better regulated market mechanism.
In many emerging/transition economies, the e#ective ﬁnancial intermediation has
a long way to go to work well with the private sector initiative. One typical model of
ﬁnancial intermediation is depicted in the following diagram where domestically cre-
ated savings, in particular from the household sector are channeled to the business
(corporate) sector through either the banking channel or the capital market channel:
In many transition economies, however, savings have failed to be mobilized for
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productive economic activities. Household savings are often asleep in the form of
mattress savings of hard foreign currencies and the business sector has been dependent
on bank loans, often directed by the authorities, many of which are ﬁnanced from the
central bank and external sources. In the meantime, it will take a longer time to
establish the framework of capital markets. Such situation is depicted as follows:
While the Uzbek banking sector has strengthened its capital basis by intensiﬁed
capital requirements and capital replenishment from the government, the Uzbek bank-
ing sector has already reached a stage where administrative functional requirements
Figure 3. Financial intermediation
Figure 4. Financial intermediation in some transition economies
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beyond basic banking services are discontinued and practical restrictions on cash
withdrawals are eliminated.
That is, the banking sector is in a position to provide banking services without
government intervention and take the initiative to promote household deposits
and business loans to both strategically important industrial activities and small/
medium-sized businesses. The regulatory and policy authorities could focus on capital-
related prudential aspects as well as compliance aspects of anti-money laundering
(AML) and combating the ﬁnancing of terrorism (CFT). In these circumstances, with
more emphasis on the private initiative, Uzbek banks will ﬁnd their own ways for
mobilizing savings toward productive economic activities. (More emphasis on the
private sector initiative will also provide the longer-term basis for domestic demand-
based market economy and harmonized trade relationships with neighboring countries
and the rest of the world.)
The more trustworthy the domestic ﬁnancial intermediary channel, the less depend-
ent on the changeable external sources. With the consolidated ﬁnancial infrastructure,
the adverse impacts from external shocks will be e#ectively delinked and a sound
economic management will be more e#ectively ensured.
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